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1. For more than half a century, countless nongovernmental organizations, scientific experts, political leaders, and ordinary citizens have pursued the goal of a more secure world, free of the dangers of nuclear weapon test explosions.

Yet, after almost fifty years of hard work and advocacy, we have not crossed the finish line. More must be done to achieve the CTBT’s entry into force.

2. We, the representatives of nongovernmental organizations from across the globe call on all states that have not done so, to sign and ratify the treaty. We call upon all states to take the steps needed to secure the signatures and ratifications of the 10 remaining Annex II states to bring the CTBT into force.

3a. The CTBT is important to all states—North and South, East and West, large and small, with nuclear weapons and without. The CTBT is essential for the prevention of nuclear arms races, the development of increasingly destructive weapons, the prevention of more states acquiring nuclear arsenals, and the protection of human health and the global environment from the effects of testing.

3b. CTBT entry into force would also shore up support for the increasingly beleaguered nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime. The nuclear-weapon states’ commitment to the test ban’s entry into force was vital in securing the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. The continued failure by a few states to move forward with the CTBT undermines the confidence in the nonproliferation bargain and perpetuates the outdated 20^th century belief that nuclear weapons are necessary and legitimate tools of foreign policy.

5a. CTBT entry into force is even more urgent and overdue. Specifically, we strongly urge this conference to:

a) reiterate that a state’s signature of the treaty constitutes an obligation not to conduct a nuclear test explosion, and that the CTBT establishes a norm of behavior that applies to states that have not yet signed the treaty;

b) call upon all signatory states to provide necessary support for the treaty’s monitoring and verification system, including on-site inspection;

c) urge states not to engage in nuclear trade with countries that have not yet joined the CTBT regime; and

d) call upon de facto and de jure nuclear-armed states to cease and desist from research and development activities that may create pressure to conduct nuclear test explosions in the future.

6b. We urge governments of CTBT signatories to maintain their public support for the treaty. This conference’s official statement is a step in the right direction. But rhetoric alone is not enough. Consistent, high-level pressure is necessary to move states to sign and/or ratify the treaty.

7a. Special attention should be focused on securing ratification by Israel, Egypt, and Iran. This would reduce nuclear weapons-related security concerns and bring these states further into the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream. Egyptian and Iranian steps to build and allow the operation of monitoring stations on their territories would also be helpful. The Pakistan-India nuclear arms race could be contained to the benefit of both countries if they signed and ratified the CTBT.

8. The world’s patience is also wearing thin with China and the United States.

The leadership in Beijing must fulfill its repeated and now somewhat empty promise to conclude the ratification process. China could demonstrate it is a true leader and not simply a follower by finally ratifying the CTBT.

9. Despite U.S. leadership for the treaty’s negotiation, the current U.S. presidential administration does not support CTBT entry into force. However, there are new and hopeful signs that a bipartisan process may be initiated as early as 2009 to reconsider ratification of the CTBT. We note that former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, along with former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, former Senator Sam Nunn, and other prominent Democratic and Republican foreign policy experts have joined many NGOs in calling on the Senate “to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.”

10. Other states also must do their part and ratify. There is no compelling reason why states such as Indonesia and Colombia, which consistently profess their support for the CTBT, should continue to dither.

11. We also wish to express our most serious concern over the October 2006 nuclear detonation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We call upon this conference to call upon the DPRK to sign the CTBT as a good faith signal of its intentions to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

12a. The unwelcome North Korean nuclear test explosion, however, demonstrated once more the robust nature of the treaty’s verification and monitoring system.

But we are deeply concerned about the failure of certain signatories to fully fund the CTBT Organization. As of September 4th, the largest contributor, the United States, is now some $13.5 million behind in fulfilling its assessed contributions, while Brazil is $10.9 million in arrears, and Argentina is $6 million in arrears. All of the several signatory states that are behind in their assessed contributions must act now to become part of the solution rather than a part of the problem.

13b. Ongoing activities at the test sites of China, Russia, and the United States also have the potential to ignite concerns about noncompliance with the CTBT. Current subcritical experiments, contained chemical explosions, and tunneling activities are unnecessary. We call on China, Russia, the United States, and others to permanently close their test sites and pursue additional transparency and confidence building visits to decrease concerns about activities not compliant with the CTBT.

14a. We are also deeply concerned that certain CTBT signatory states are pursuing nuclear trade arrangements with India, which has refused to join the NPT and the CTBT.

14b. We urge CTBT signatory governments that are also members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to establish CTBT signature as a condition of nuclear trade before they agree to exempt India from the NSG’s full-scope international safeguards condition of nuclear supply. If India is prepared to take on the responsibilities expected of other advanced nuclear nations, it is reasonable to expect that India can sign the CTBT, as the five original nuclear-weapon states have done.

14c. We also note that the proposed U.S.-India agreement for nuclear cooperation does not explicitly state that the United States would terminate civil nuclear trade with India in the event that New Delhi were to renew nuclear testing. Incredibly, the agreement also commits the United States to support the creation of a strategic fuel reserve for India and to help India gain access to fuel supplies from other suppliers if nuclear fuel supplies are interrupted—even if the interruption is due to an Indian nuclear test. It would be highly irresponsible for CTBT signatories who are members of the NSG to allow trade with India if it were to resume testing.

15. We are particularly disappointed that some states that have in the past strongly advocated CTBT entry into force appear to have abandoned their CTBT principles and their duty to support UN Resolution 1172, which was the international community’s response to the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Not only have the United States, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom failed to condition their support for renewed nuclear trade with India on New Delhi’s support for the CTBT, but Australia has also apparently abandoned its CTBT efforts vis-à-vis India by considering the sale of uranium to India.

Only two years ago, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer chaired the fourth Article XIV Conference and said of states like India that are obstructing entry into force: "We have, over the years, heard many reasons as to why this is so. The time for excuses is past. It is time for them to act."

16a. We note with concern that CTBT signatories possessing nuclear weapons – France, China, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom – also continue to pursue nuclear weapons research activities.

16b. In particular, the Bush administration’s pursuit of a new, so-called reliable replacement warhead could undermine the CTBT and provide other states with a cynical excuse to pursue new nuclear weapons capabilities and to keep their nuclear testing options open.

The production of new nuclear warheads is unnecessary to maintain existing nuclear weapons stockpiles under the CTBT and is contrary to the spirit of the CTBT and the commitments of states under Article VI of the NPT.

16d. We urge states gathered at this Article XIV Conference to formally call upon states possessing nuclear weapons to refrain from research and development efforts that could lead to new warheads and possibly the resumption of nuclear testing.

17a. The treaty’s broader political and security benefits are clear. But at its most basic level, the treaty exists to ban the explosive testing of nuclear weapons and to prevent the devastating effects of such tests on human health and the environment.

18. Finally, we must not lose sight of the moral dimension of the CTBT—a dimension equal to that of national and international security. Future generations depend on the wisdom and courage of today’s leaders to protect them from the effects of the most dangerous weapons ever to curse humanity. No government should stand in the way of this indispensable step toward eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons and preventing nuclear war.

19. We express our gratitude for the opportunity to address the conference, to the secretariat and other organizers, and to the hard work and dedication of the staff and leadership of the CTBTO.

20. This presentation was prepared and supported by the NGOs that have been working for the banning of nuclear tests for many years, in many countries, and in many ways.

We look forward to the day when all of our efforts bring about the entry into force of the CTBT.

CTBT moves world closer to being free of nuclear weapons,

says UN Secretary-General

Convening of the fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty in Vienna

Vienna, 17 September 2007:

In a message to participants in the two-day Conference to promote the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT), UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on those States that have not signed or ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible.

The message was delivered by H.E. Sergio Duarte, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, at the opening of the Conference that gathered representatives of over 100 States. Calling the Treaty a major instrument in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, the Secretary-General said it would move mankind to the larger goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons and ensure that 9 October 2006, the date of the announced nuclear by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, would be recorded in history books as the date of the world’s last nuclear test ever.

The Treaty opened for signature eleven years ago and, with 177 signatures and 140 ratifications, is close to universality. Particular attention is being directed at the 44 so-called Annex 2 States whose ratification is a precondition for the Treaty’s entry into force. Only 34 of the 44 have already ratified the Treaty. The ten remaining States are: China, Colombia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States of America. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan have not yet signed the Treaty.

The fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT is jointly presided over by the Foreign Ministers of Austria and Costa Rica, H.E. Dr. Ursula Plassnik and H.E. Bruno Stagno Ugarte. “This shared Presidency by two CTBT Member States representing two different geographic regions symbolizes the global support for the Treaty”, Dr. Plassnik said in her opening remarks. It testified that the issues of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were of universal concern and highlighted the necessity for world-wide cooperation in the fight against global threats, she added.

Saying that encouraging progress has been made, Stagno Ugarte pointed out that 14 States had ratified the CTBT, including the Annex 2 State Vietnam, since the last conference in 2005. Regarding the remaining ten Annex 2 States whose ratification was needed for entry into force, Stagno Ugarte said that none of the obstacles delaying ratification seemed insurmountable. “The key to accelerate the process remains the leadership role the United States would be ready to assume”, he said. Stagno Ugarte mentioned the editorial of 4 January 2007 in the Wall Street Journal by the former bipartisan US foreign policy and defence leaders, Kissinger, Schultz, Perry and Nunn and said that it augured well for a new dynamic in strategic thinking. This kind of renewed support for the CTBT should give a new sense and hope to the efforts in bringing about the Treaty’s early entry into force.

The build-up of the CTBT verification regime has moved on steadily and with remarkable results, said Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO). In the two years since the last Conference promoting the Treaty, the number of certified monitoring facilities had increased by 60%. The verification system also had to endure a performance test when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea claimed on 9 October 2006 that it had conducted a nuclear test. This test “constituted the most serious trial to the norm against nuclear testing for many years”, Tóth said. The event in the DPRK constituted a validation of the CTBT global verification system, which proved its value to States Signatories. Tóth also stressed that, as regrettable and disquieting as the event had been, it had also underscored the urgency of bringing the Treaty into force and completing the build-up of the CTBT verification system.

The outgoing Coordinator of efforts to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty, Ambassador Peter Shannon of Australia, welcomed the joint presidency by Costa Rica and Austria, saying that “the geographic diversity of this arrangement is a positive reflection of the growing universality of the Treaty”. Referring to the increasing number of States which had signed and ratified the Treaty, Shannon said that this showed the commitment of the overwhelming majority of States to the goals of the CTBT. The remarkable increase from 125 to 140 ratifications over the past two years emphasized the effectiveness of sustained pressure on States Signatories to ratify the Treaty.

Jaap Ramaker, Special Representative to promote the CTBT ratification process, said “the world needs a complete ban on nuclear weapon test explosions. It needs the CTBT. This Treaty will cap the development of ever more destructive weapons. It constitutes the last barrier against a nuclear programme turning into a nuclear weapons programme.” In his capacity as Special Representative, Ramaker had visited most of the Annex 2 non-ratifying countries. He pointed out their primary concerns: the financial implications and lack of resources; the need to give higher priority to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation; and, on the positive side, a growing interest in the concrete benefits of the verification regime.

Pointing out the fact that Hungary was amongst the Annex 2 States whose ratification was required for entry into force, H.E. Dr Kinga Göncz, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said it was amongst the first to sign the Treaty in September 1996 and ratified it in July 1999. She stressed the importance of “exploring and developing the potential civil and scientific applications of the monitoring regime … in a number of areas, such as environment, earth science and technology and disaster alert systems”.

H.E. Aristides Fernandez Zucco, Minister of Energy of the Dominican Republic, spoke as the representative of the State that had most recently ratified the CTBT on 4 September 2007, making it the 140^th State to do so. Zucco said that the CTBT was the result of more than 40 years of efforts to establish an international legal instrument for verifying a ban on nuclear testing.

H.E. Hitoshi Kimura, Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, emphasized that Japan supported the CTBT, which “underpins the international nuclear non-proliferation regime founded on the NPT, as a practical and concrete measure for realising a nuclear-weapon free world.” Against the backdrop of the proclaimed nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in October 2006, Kimura noted the Yongbyon nuclear facility had been shut down recently as one of the actions towards the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In working towards a peaceful resolution of nuclear issues, the maintenance of a moratorium on nuclear testing was imperative. “As the only nation ever to have suffered nuclear devastation, Japan calls on the international community to ensure that nuclear testing is never carried out by any country ever again.”

Speaking on behalf of the European Union, H.E. João Gomes Cravinho, Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, said that each new signature and ratification to the CTBT brought the world closer to its common objective of universal adherence to the Treaty and thus to a safer world. Reflecting the European Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, he said that a multilateral approach provided the best means to counter such threats from which no region or State was immune. The EU was in a unique position to promote the CTBT since all 27 Member States have signed and ratified the Treaty.

H.E. Dato’ Mohd Arshad M. Hussein, Permanent Representative of Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), expressed his strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism. He underlined that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions provided “the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues”. He reiterated NAM’s long-standing and principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing. He also expressed NAM’s concern about the decision of one nuclear weapon State’s alleged intention to invest in a Reliable Replacement Warhead, thus modernizing its nuclear infrastructure and raising the prospect of returning to underground testing.

As host country of this Conference, the representative of Austria, H.E. Johannes Kyrle, Secretary General of the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, said that his country bore special responsibility for the successful preparations for the CTBT’s entry into force. He reaffirmed the important position of the CTBT within the United Nations’ nuclear non-proliferation regime, especially its close relationship with the NPT and its function as a “double-lock”. He quoted UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s recent statement saying that “I see emerging in the world today a zero tolerance of any further test of nuclear explosive devices. I hope to see the day when this expectation is made legally binding and remain convinced that the CTBT is the way that this goal would be ultimately achieved.”

Mr. Cristiano Dos Santos, delegate of the Republic of Mozambique, informed the Conference of the advanced stage of the CTBT ratification process, which had already been considered by his country’s Cabinet and would be submitted to Parliament during its next session scheduled for October of this year. The package of international legal instruments would also include the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the Pelindaba Treaty.

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